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THE INDUS BASIN: WATER COOPERATION, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDUS WATERS 
TREATY 
* Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi
Water cooperation is essential for riparian states to equitably 
distribute and utilize their transboundary water resources. In South Asia, 
Pakistan and India are lower and upper riparian states, respectively, 
sharing the Indus Basin. The Indus Waters Treaty is a fundamental 
bilateral agreement, establishing a mechanism for them to cooperate over 
water. However, certain factors result in disrupting the cooperation, such 
as the continued construction of controversial Indian dams, Indian 
regional water hegemony policy, the existence of historic hostilities, and 
the discussion of the Kashmir issue in the bilateral peace dialogues. In 
addition to the IWT, international law includes obligations for states to 
cooperate in the use of shared transboundary watercourses. In this regard, 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
establishes a duty to cooperate for the equitable utilization and joint 
management of transboundary watercourses. The Berlin Rules 
recommend the establishment of water cooperation to riparian states for 
their mutual benefit. Moreover, other states have also cooperated over 
water; India and Pakistan can emulate them by establishing a persistent 
and symbiotic cooperation that would result in providing mutual benefits. 
Keywords: Water Cooperation, Indus Waters Treaty, Indus Basin, 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Berlin 
Rules.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water cooperation is an essential feature of managing international 
watercourses among riparian states.1 It requires riparian states to 
coordinate with one another through the sharing of information and the 
creation of joint cooperative mechanisms for the optimal utilization of 
water resources for mutual benefit.2 In this spirit, cooperation was 
established for the sharing of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan 
with the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) fifty-seven years ago.3
Both states acted upon the treaty and cooperated with each other through
the formation of a joint body–the Permanent Indus Commission.4
However, over time this cooperation mechanism deteriorated owing to 
the initiation of controversial dams by India.5
India did not act upon the legitimate concerns of Pakistan regarding 
the controversial dams, and this has been particularly so over the last two 
decades.6 Moreover, India has also given a recent official statement 
suggesting that it might revoke or modify the IWT, a decision that would 
completely terminate cooperation over the water of the Indus Basin.7
Such an action would also be against India’s international legal 
obligations, which require cooperation among riparian states.8 This paper 
explores these legal obligations. 
1. Robert Hollaender, German Experiences in River Basin Co-operation, in
INTERSECTORAL MANAGEMENT OF RIVER BASINS 320, 325–26 (Charles L. Abernethy ed., 
2001). 
2. Id. at 324.
3. ROCKIN TH. SINGH, INDIA’S WATER RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS 151
(2011). 
4. WATER CRISIS IN INDIA 260 (K.R. Gupta ed., 2008).
5. See Anwar Iqbal, Pakistan Not to Accept Alteration in Indus Waters Treaty,
DAWN (Dec. 17, 2016), https://www.dawn.com/news/1302848 (regarding the ongoing 
wave of noncooperation and hostility over Indus waters). 
6. Id. For details regarding the contentious dams of India, see Undala Alam,
India and Pakistan’s Truculent Cooperation: Can it Continue?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 406, 416–18 (Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that a controversy from the late 90’s led to 
dispute resolution for the first time under the treaty terms). 
7. See Iqbal, supra note 5.
8. Owen McIntyre, International Water Law: Concepts, Evolution and
Development, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 59,
69 (Anton Earle et al. eds., 2013).
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The paper is divided into four sections. The first section includes an 
explanation of the term “water cooperation” and its significance at the 
international level. The contemporary situation of water cooperation in 
the Indus Basin is also discussed, along with the factors that have 
deteriorated cooperation. The second section of this paper assesses the 
cooperation mechanism enshrined in the IWT. The third section makes 
recommendations for international law regarding water cooperation, 
while the last and fourth section notes some examples of water 
cooperation among states. 
II. WATER COOPERATION
Cooperation is an essential characteristic of international relations, as 
it plays a key role in maintaining the cordial nature of relations among 
states.9 It can be defined as a procedure by which two or more parties or 
states work together to accomplish mutual goals that could not be 
achieved by one state unilaterally.10 On a similar note, the term water 
cooperation implies an establishment of coordination among two or more 
parties or states over the distribution, utilization, and management of 
their shared water resources.11
Water cooperation has gained significant attention in recent years12
because several countries are approaching water scarcity and because 
several disputes have emerged among states in recent history over the 
distribution of their common transboundary water resources, which have 
needed to be resolved through the establishment of cooperative 
9. Id.
10. CHRISTINA LEB, COOPERATION IN THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
RESOURCES 1 (2013). 
11. Id. at 2.
12. See McIntyre, supra note 8, at 69 (discussing the emergence of legal
principles and state practice of water cooperation in the recent years, prominently in last 
two and a half decades); see also L. Veiga Cunha, Water: A Human Right or an 
Economic Resource?, in WATER ETHICS: MARCELINO BOTÍN WATER FORUM 2007 97, 111
(M. Ramón Llamas et al. eds., 2009). 
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measures.13 Several states rely on freshwater for their agricultural 
subsistence and energy production.14
When states own transboundary freshwater resources, they claim their 
ownership over it as a means of expressing their sovereign right over that 
water resource.15 If a common watercourse passes through two or more 
states and they are geographically the upper and lower riparian states, 
then this creates a problematic situation when the upper riparian state 
utilizes more than its share of water by diverting a significant quantity 
toward its own land for agricultural or any other purposes, subsequently 
resulting in a shortage of water in the basin of that water resource for the 
lower riparian state.16 Such exploitation is now prohibited by 
international law.17 However, in the event of violation or incomplete 
compliance of international law by the upper riparian state, the lower 
riparian state feels the need to resort to dialogue or some other 
cooperative measures to convey its concerns to the upper riparian state. 
Hence, this establishes a need for cooperation among riparian states. In 
this regard, international law also includes special provisions for 
maintaining efficient mechanisms of cooperation among riparian states.18
Through these cooperative measures, riparian states can avoid causing 
harm to one another by utilizing their shared transboundary water 
resource.19
This paper will evaluate water cooperation in the Indus Basin, which 
is shared by India and Pakistan. The Indus Basin is the major source of 
13. See Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing, Introduction, in IMAGINING INDUSTAN:
OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 3, 4 (Zafar Adeel & Robert G. 
Wirsing eds., 2016). 
14. See THE MULTI-GOVERNANCE OF WATER: FOUR CASE STUDIES 148 (Matthias
Finger et al. eds., 2006).
15. EVERYDAY MODERNITY IN CHINA 312 (Madeleine Yue Dong & Joshua L.
Goldstein eds., 2006); see also ERIKA WEINTHAL, STATE MAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION: LINKING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 43
(2002). 
16. Mohamed Sameh Amr, Diversion of International Watercourses Under
International Law, 10 AFRICAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 109, 177 (2004). 
17. Id.
18. See McIntyre, supra note 8, at 69.
19. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 51/229, annex, Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, art. 7(1) (May 21, 1997). 
48 Michigan State ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ [Vol. 26.1
water for Pakistan.20 It comprises the Indus River and its five tributaries, 
namely the Chenab, Jhelum, Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers.21 The water in 
the Indus Basin reaches Pakistan after passing through India and certain 
parts of the Kashmir and Jammu Valleys,22 having originated in the 
Himalayan glaciers.23
The Indus Basin holds key importance for Pakistan and India24
because its water irrigates a major crop area in both countries.25
Therefore, both states must cooperate to reap the collective benefits of 
the common basin. The efforts for water cooperation in the Indus Basin 
between India and Pakistan became successful historically in 1960 when 
the World Bank brokered the IWT.26 This treaty guides both states in 
utilizing Indus Basin water.27 Acting upon the principles of equitable 
utilization and justice, the treaty prescribes a simple formula for 
distributing the water of the basin and all of its tributaries, allotting the 
three eastern river tributaries of the Indus to India and the three western 
river tributaries to Pakistan.28 Furthermore, the treaty established the 
Permanent Indus Commission as a joint body responsible for resolving 
20. Ashok Swain, Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of
Noncooperation, in IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS
BASIN, supra note 13, at 37, 39.
21. F. Naz, Water: A Cause of Power Politics in South Asia, in WATER AND
SOCIETY II 101, 103 (C.A. Brebbia ed., 2013). 
22. WINSTON YU ET AL., THE INDUS BASIN OF PAKISTAN: THE IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE RISKS ON WATER AND AGRICULTURE 58–59 (2013). 
23. JAGDISH BAHADUR, HIMALAYAN SNOW AND GLACIERS: ASSOCIATED
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 81 (2004); see also P.C. TIWARI
& BHAGWATI JOSHI, WILDLIFE IN THE HIMALAYAN FOOTHILLS: CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 73 (1997). 
24. See Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 13, at 12.
25. See Muhammad Jehanzeb Masud Cheema et al., Assessment of Water
Allocations Using Remote Sensing and GIS Modeling for Indus Basin, Pakistan 15 (Int’l 
Food Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 036, 2016); David Michael, Managing 
the Indus in a Warming World: The Potential for Transboundary Cooperation in Coping 
with Climate Change, in IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE
INDUS BASIN, supra note 13, at 3, 105.
26. SINGH, supra note 3, at 151; see also AHJOND S. GARMESTANI & CRAIG R.
ALLEN, SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW 185 (2014). 
27. See McIntyre, supra note 8, at 196.
28. See LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 163–64
(2012). 
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bilateral differences through cooperation.29 The treaty has successfully 
survived the tense years of conflicts, wars, and hostilities between the 
states and therefore holds key importance in maintaining the water 
cooperation between them.30
However, recently India has indicated its intention to revoke or 
modify the IWT,31 as it is keen to acquire a larger share of the water in 
the western rivers: the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus rivers.32 The 
revocation of the IWT will mean a total absence of cooperation over the 
Indus.33 This sense of noncooperation between India and Pakistan has not 
appeared suddenly; rather, its roots have strengthened over the last 
couple of decades with India’s failure to cooperate with Pakistan over 
certain provisions of the IWT: the sharing of accurate data on its present 
and upcoming water storage projects, non-consumptive use, and other 
issues related to its dams on the waters of the Pakistani western rivers.34
The absence of dialogues and repeated Indian government official 
statements endorsing a reconsideration of the IWT for its modification or 
revocation have created a sense of noncooperation and hostility between 
both states. 
29. MATTHEW ZENTNER, DESIGN AND IMPACT OF WATER TREATIES: MANAGING
CLIMATE CHANGE 137 (2011); see also SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & KISHOR UPRETY,
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION ON SOUTH ASIA’S INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 200 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2003).
30. R. NAGARAJAN, DROUGHT ASSESSMENT 418 (2010).
31. India Reminded of Obligations Under Waters Accord, DAWN (Dec. 2,
2016), https://www.dawn.com/news/1299912. 
32. PM Modi Reviews Indus Water Treaty, Says ‘Blood and Water Can’t Flow
Together’, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 26, 2016, 6:48 PM), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-Modi-reviews-Indus-Water-Treaty-says-
blood-and-water-cant-flow-together/articleshow/54526722.cms. 
33. See THE IMPACT OF ASIAN POWERS ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 84 (Erich
Reiter & Peter Hazdra eds., 2004). This is because the Indus Waters Treaty is the only 
bilateral treaty that facilitates and recommends both states to establish water cooperation 
between them. 
34. See, e.g., ALIAR HOSSAIN & MARK T. JONES, DEVELOPING THE MINISTERIAL 
MINDSET: A GLOBAL VIEW 36 (2013). 
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A. Reasons for the Failure of Persistent Water Cooperation in the 
Indus Basin 
Certain reasons have contributed to disrupting the cooperation 
between the states on water utilization and several other issues. These 
reasons have been present throughout the history of their relations and 
have contributed to the absence of cooperation. The major factors and 
reasons are elucidated below. 
1. Indian Regional Water Hegemony
In South Asia, India has the geographical position of being an upper 
riparian state to Bangladesh and Pakistan.35 This position gives India an 
advantage over both states to exploit its utilization of shared river 
basins.36 Pakistan is not the only country that has water-related issues 
with India, for Bangladesh is also affected by inequitable Indian 
utilization of shared transboundary river waters.37 India and Bangladesh 
share fifty-four rivers.38 There is also a treaty between both states—the 
Ganges River Treaty39—however, Bangladesh still has issues with India 
over the distribution of Ganges River water.40 Historically, India has 
continued to release large amounts of Ganges River water to Bangladesh 
to protect its own regions around the Ganges from inundation during the 
rainy season.41 However, the diversion at Farakka Barrage, located in the 
Indian State of West Bengal, has resulted in devastating floods in 
35. Sheila Rai & Sanghamitra Patnaik, Water Disputes in South Asia, in WATER
RESOURCE CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 103, 104
(Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi ed., 2011).
36. INDIA AND THE AGE OF CRISIS: THE LOCAL POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC
AND ECOLOGICAL FRAGILITY 97 (Michael Gillan & Rob Lambert eds., 2015). 
37. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
RESOURCES, CONSUMPTION, AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS 97 (David E. Lorey ed., 2003). 
38. A.K. CHATURVEDI, WATER: A SOURCE FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS 147 (2013).
39. CARLO CARRARO ET AL., APPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATION THEORY TO WATER
ISSUES 23 (2005). 
40. SANTOSH SINGH, US POLICY AND APPROACH TOWARDS NEPAL, BANGLADESH 
AND SRI LANKA, 1992-2003 43 (2016). 
41. PRANAB KUMAR PARUA, THE GANGA: WATER USE IN THE INDIAN
SUBCONTINENT 244 (2009); Mohammad Abul Kawser & Md. Abdus Samad, Political 
History of Farakka Barrage and its Effects on the Environment in Bangladesh, 3:16 
BANDUNG: JOURNAL OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 10–11 (2016). 
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Bangladesh.42 According to Bangladesh’s government authorities, such 
an inundation of its territory has resulted in significant losses related to 
the devastation of crops, the death of livestock, damage to public and 
private property, damage to forestry and fisheries, hazards to health and 
environment, and losses to the economy.43
On the other hand, another dispute is raised by Bangladesh over the 
distribution of water of the Teesta River.44 Bangladesh demands 
equitable water apportionment in this river and has also requested that 
India sign a treaty agreeing to allocate Bangladesh its due share of Teesta 
river water.45 The Indian government initially agreed to do so; however, 
at the very last moment before signing the treaty the former Indian prime 
minister Manmohan Singh backed off the agreement and did not sign it 
during his short visit to Bangladesh in 2011.46 Political and 
administrative circles in Bangladesh have criticized India’s U-turn.47
They accuse India of establishing regional water hegemony over 
Bangladesh.48 The case is similar for the Barak River, on which India is 
constructing a hydropower project, which Bangladesh views as a threat 
to the water supply available in downstream Bangladesh.49
This situation is similar to India’s water management issues with 
Pakistan, as Pakistan has also repeatedly accused India of inequitable and 
unjustified utilization of western river waters within Indian territory.50
Pakistan maintains that the Indian water storage projects over the western 
rivers have the capacity to deprive a large community in Pakistan of their 
due share of western river waters because the capacities of Indian dams 
42. Kawser & Samad, supra note 41, at 6.
43. THE GANGES WATER DIVERSION: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS AND
IMPLICATIONS 201 (M. Monirul Qader Mirza ed., 2004). 
44. ARIJIT MAZUMDAR, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: RELATIONS WITH 
SOUTH ASIA 94 (2014). 
45. MD. FAKRUL ISLAM, WATER USE AND POVERTY REDUCTION 37 (2016).
46. BJØRN-OLIVER MAGSIG, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND THE QUEST FOR
COMMON SECURITY 171 (2015). 
47. Id.
48. See DAVID LEWIS, BANGLADESH: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 31
(2011).
49. WATER AND THE LAW: TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 53 (Alejandro Iza, et al.
eds., 2014). 
50. Shaheen Akhtar, Emerging Challenges to Indus Waters Treaty: Issues of
Compliance & Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydroprojects on the Western Rivers,
XXVIII Regional Stud. 3, 15 (2010). 
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are tremendously high.51 Pakistan has also alleged that India has adopted 
a hegemonic regional water policy through depriving Pakistan of its due 
share of water in the river basins.52 Such a situation also creates a lack of 
trust between both states and any invitation from one side that includes 
suggestions for cooperation over water is deemed suspicious by the other 
side,53 which inhibits the cooperation between them.54
It is in the core interests of both India and Pakistan to establish 
sustainable cooperation for the development of the Indus Basin to 
achieve mutual benefits from the efficient use of the water of the basin. 
Both nations are emerging economies that depend largely on agriculture, 
which is reliant on river water for irrigation.55 Therefore, it is in the 
interests of both to initiate cooperation for the better utilization and 
management of their shared water resources. 
2. Controversial Indian Water Storage Projects
India is continuing the construction of the water storage projects to 
which the Pakistani government has expressed its reservations.56 As per 
the official stance of the government of Pakistan, these water storage 
projects have the potential to cause significant harm to Pakistan in terms 
of substantially decreasing the flow of water to its rivers.57 Pertinently, 
Pakistan has shared its concerns over twenty-seven Indian water storage 
51. See Kristina Roic et al., The Ebb and Flow of Water Conflicts: A Case Study
of India and Pakistan, in IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE
INDUS BASIN, supra note 13, at 49, 54; see also Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 13, at 10. 
52. See AHMED ABUKHATER, WATER AS A CATALYST FOR PEACE:
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13 (2016).
53. See Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of Noncooperation, supra
, note 20, at 41. 
54. See FROM MEDIATION TO NATION-BUILDING: THIRD PARTIES AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT 406 (Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. & William J. 
Lahneman eds., 2013) (explaining effect of lack of mutual trust between rival states). 
55. DISTORTIONS TO AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 1955–
2007 390 (Kym Anderson ed., 2009). 
56. See Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of Noncooperation, supra
note 20, at 40. 
57. Id. For a detailed stance on the Baglehar Dam, see Ariel Dinar et al., BRIDGES
OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND
COOPERATION 332 (2013). For Pakistan’s stance on the Kishanganga Dam, see Rai & 
Patnaik, supra note 35, at 124. For further details, see Alam, supra note 6, at 416–17. 
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projects and dams.58 However, no special progress has been made by 
India in hearing the concerns of Pakistan and providing accurate data to 
Pakistan related to its water storage projects.59
The most prominent of the controversial Indian water storage works 
are the Kishanganga Dam on the Neelum and Jhelum Rivers, the 
Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River, the Ratle Dam on the Chenab River, 
the Wullar Barrage on the Indus River, the Salal Dam on the Chenab 
River, and the Dul Husti power project on the Chenab River.60
Additionally there are several other, smaller water storage projects.61
According to Pakistani authorities, these dams and hydropower projects 
can significantly affect the natural flow of water in the western rivers;62
thus, they present a threat to Pakistan’s irrigation system, which is 
naturally vulnerable to changes in the flow of the western rivers.63
For instance, the Kishanganga Dam, one of the aforementioned water 
storage projects of India, is liable to create drought in the Neelum Valley 
in the Azad Kashmir State of Pakistan.64 This is because India is 
constructing the Kishanganga Dam by diverting the Neelum River away 
from the Neelum Valley,65 which will result in a decrease of flow of 
water in the valley.66 This beautiful valley depends entirely on the water 
of the Neelum River for the drinking, domestic, and agrarian needs of its 
people.67 Therefore, a lack of water in the Neelum River in this valley 
can result in severe problems, including drought.68 Similar threats are 
carried by the other Indian water storage projects.
58. See Akhtar, supra note 50, at 15.
59. Hossain & Jones, supra note 34, at 36.
60. See Akhtar, supra note 50, at 30; see also Mubarak Zeb Khan, India Asked to
Stop Work on Kishanganga and Ratle Projects, DAWN (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1309767. 
61. See id. at 28–29.
62. Id. at 30.
63. See generally id.
64. See Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, The Indus Waters Treaty: Modernizing the
Normative Pillars to Build a More Resilient Future, in IMAGINING INDUSTAN:
OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN, supra note 13, at 69, 79; see also
Rai & Patnaik, supra note 35, at 124–25. 
65. See Magsig, supra note 64, at 79.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 80.
68. See Magsig, supra note 64, at 79.
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3. Failure of Dialogues and Cooperative Peace Processes
Although peace dialogues have been held between both states and 
under different governments,69 these dialogues have often concluded in 
failure and have never facilitated perpetual cooperation and a sense of 
friendship between the states.70 The major reason for the failure of 
dialogue between India and Pakistan has been the Kashmir issue.71
Neither state is willing to negotiate or soften its stance over Kashmir.72
Consequently, deadlock occurs in the dialogue, which leads to failure of 
the discussions and spoils the initiatives already taken for peace and 
cooperation.73
Terrorists and nonstate actors also play their role in disrupting the 
peace process, dialogues, and cooperation.74 As evident from history, 
whenever a severe terrorist incident has taken place in either of the two 
states, the affected state has blamed the other of being involved.75 For 
instance, after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India blamed Pakistan, without 
69. Du Youkang, Changes in South Asia Since 9/11 and China’s Policy Options,
in CHALLENGES TO CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: DIPLOMACY, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE
NEXT WORLD POWER 183, 187 (Yufan Hao et al. eds., 2009). 
70. Happymon Jacob, The India-Pakistan Peace Process, in PAKISTAN’S
STABILITY PARADOX: DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 91, 97 
(Ashutosh Misra & Michael E. Clarke eds., 2012). 
71. Wajahat Habibullah, The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict:
Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy, U.S. INST. OF PEACE
(2004), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr121.pdf; see also Jayantanuja 
Bandyopadhyaya, From Non-Alignment to Pro-Imperialism: Class and Foreign Policy in 
India, in INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 1, 15 (Anjali Gosh et al. eds., 2009). 
72. See Habibullah, supra note 71.
73. See RAJKUMAR SINGH, RELATION OF NDA AND UPA WITH NEIGHBOURS 53–54
(2010). 
74. Sagarika Dutt, South Asia, in HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY
255, 264 (James Sperling ed., 2014). 
75. MARY GLORIA C. NJOKU & CHRISTIAN C. ANIEKE, 2 STORIES OF PEACE:
CREATING AND SUSTAINING PEACE THROUGH SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EDUCATION 76
(2016); see also CHARLES HAUSS & MELISSA HAUSSMAN, COMPARATIVE POLITICS:
DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 361 (2012). 
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evidence, for sponsoring the attacks.76 Unfortunately, the attacks wrecked 
the peace and cooperation process at that time.77
Notably, a couple of days before the Mumbai attacks, the then 
President of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, said in his speech that 
Pakistan’s relations with India should be improved to achieve mutual 
economic growth through bilateral cooperation, leaving aside Kashmir to 
be resolved by future generations.78 Peace dialogues between the Indian 
and Pakistani officials were being held at that time, in which collective 
economic goals were the main subject of discussion.79 However, soon 
after the Mumbai attacks, the talks were canceled by India, which 
instigated a sense of conflict, animosity, and geopolitical rift between 
India and Pakistan.80
4. Historic Factors
In addition to the factors listed above, there are some historic factors 
that have resulted in creating a sense of hostility and noncooperation 
between India and Pakistan, generally on geopolitical terrain and 
specifically on Indus water. 
a. Hostile History of Wars
India and Pakistan have an antagonistic common history as archrivals 
since their creation.81 They have fought four major wars within the last 
seventy years: the 1947 war on Kashmir issue, the 1965 war on the status 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the 1971 war when Pakistan lost its 
76. RANBIR VOHRA, THE MAKING OF INDIA: A POLITICAL HISTORY 375 (2013); K.
ALAN KRONSTADT, TERRORIST ATTACKS IN MUMBAI, INDIA, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
INTERESTS 11 (2008). 
77. NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA: THE UNITED PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE
IN POWER 140 (Lawrence Sáez & Gurharpal Singh eds., 2012) [hereinafter NEW
DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA].
78. See Shehzad H. Qazi, Strategic Posture Review: Pakistan, WORLD POL. REV.
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12782/strategic-posture-
review-pakistan. 
79. Id.
80. See NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA, supra note 77, at 140.
81. See ŠUMIT GANGULY & S. PAUL KAPUR, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE BOMB:
DEBATING NUCLEAR STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA 2 (2010). 
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Eastern wing, and the 1998 war on Kargil issue.82 These wars caused 
significant damage to the economies and all related sectors of both states, 
changing the attitudes of both nations toward each other as they started to 
see the other as their constant foe.83 Therefore, any special stance by one 
state regarding the utilization of Indus water or any other issue is 
generally viewed with a suspicious eye by the other. 
b. The Kashmir Issue
The Kashmir issue has appeared to be the major contention.84 Kashmir 
is located at the northeast of Pakistan and the northwest of India.85
Several important river tributaries flow through or originate from this
land, pass through India, and reach Pakistan.86 For this reason, Kashmir 
occupies a strategically important geographical location that is crucial for 
India and Pakistan in order to own the rivers as an upper riparian state.87
Both nations claim ideological rights over Kashmir.88 Pakistan owns 33% 
82. THE MUSLIM WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SPACE, POWER, AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 291 (Samiul Hasan ed., 2012); see also PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE
OF FIRE: A MEMOIR 286 (2006); see also PETER LYON, CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND
PAKISTAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 79–82 (2008) (elucidating a brief account of the four 
wars).  
83. See MARIO ESTEBAN CARRANZA, SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ORDER: CREATING A ROBUST INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ARMS 
CONTROL REGIME 31 (2009); see also GARY GOERTZ ET AL., THE PUZZLE OF PEACE: THE
EVOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 33 (2016). 
84. N. JAYAPALAN, FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA 237 (2001); see also PRAKASH 
NANDA, REDISCOVERING ASIA: EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S LOOK-EAST POLICY 121 (2003); 
see also RUMKI BASU, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND ISSUES 470 
(2012). 
85. CHRISTOPHER SNEDDEN, UNDERSTANDING KASHMIR AND KASHMIRIS 247
(2015); see also GEOFFREY KEMP, THE EAST MOVES WEST: INDIA, CHINA, AND ASIA’S
GROWING PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 104 (2012). 
86. WATER AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, 165 (Erika Weinthal et al. eds.,
2014); see also SUJATA KANUNGO, ECHOES FROM BEYOND THE BANIHAL-KASHMIR:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED FORCES 2 (2011). 
87. See WATER AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 86, at 173; see
also TAI YONG TAN & GYANESH KUDAISYA, THE AFTERMATH OF PARTITION IN SOUTH 
ASIA 225 (2000). 
88. See ARIE MARCELO KACOWICZ, PEACEFUL TERRITORIAL CHANGE 100 (1994).
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of Kashmir and has named it Azad Kashmir.89 The remaining territory of 
Kashmir, and where the tributaries of major rivers originate, is in the 
possession of India and is named the occupied territory of Jammu and 
Kashmir.90
Since 1947, Pakistan has demanded a United Nations (UN) 
administered plebiscite in the Jammu and Kashmir Valley on the 
allegiance of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan.91 Despite initially being 
agreed in 1948 that a plebiscite would be held in occupied Kashmir, the 
Indian authorities never facilitated it.92 Since then, Kashmir has 
generated a geopolitical and strategic rivalry between Pakistan and 
India.93 This issue has caused the failure of the cooperation and peace 
process dialogue that has taken place between both states at any moment 
in their history.94
III. THE INDUS WATERS TREATY MECHANISM FOR WATER
COOPERATION
The IWT is a fine example of cooperation between India and 
Pakistan.95 This cooperation was initiated in 1960 for distributing the 
shared Indus Basin between India and Pakistan. The IWT recommends a 
framework for bilateral cooperation, as set out below. 
89. 1 BARBARA A. WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND OCEANIA
372 (2010). 
90. Id.
91. See APARNA PANDE, EXPLAINING PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: ESCAPING
INDIA 39 (2011). 
92. See Habibullah, supra note 71, at 5.
93. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict: A
Pakistani Perspective, in ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE KARGIL CONFLICT, 41, 41 (Peter R. Lavoy ed., 2009); see also
ASIAN RIVALRIES: CONFLICT, ESCALATION, AND LIMITATIONS ON TWO-LEVEL GAMES 20 
(Sumit Ganguly & William R. Thompson eds., 2011). 
94. See Habibullah, supra note 71, at 4; see also Singh, supra note 73, at 53–54.
95. THE IMPACT OF ASIAN POWERS ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 84 (Erich Reiter &
Peter Hazdra eds., 2004) . 
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A. Information Sharing Mechanism—Article VI 
The IWT recommends that both states share data related to the flow of 
water on a daily and monthly basis.96 For instance, Article VI of the IWT 
suggests that both states should share data related to:  
I. Daily gauge . . . and discharge data relating to flow of the rivers at all 
observation sites. II. Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs. 
III. Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by
government or by a government agency . . . IV. Daily escapages from 
all canals, including link canals. [and] V. Daily deliveries from link 
canals.97
Article VI of the IWT further states that data must be shared at the 
end of each calendar month and, in any event, with delays of no more 
than three months.98 Furthermore, the IWT makes it obligatory for both 
states to share data with the other with no exceptions.99 In addition to 
this, information related to storage works initiated by a state should also 
be shared with the other.100 For instance, the design of the dam and its 
storage capacity, pondage level, tributary discharge, etc. should be 
shared with the other state.101 If either state asks for additional data, then 
this should be provided, but the cost of collecting and sharing it should 
be reimbursed.102
B. Duty to Cooperate—Article VII 
The IWT includes recommendations for both states to cooperate for 
the development of the Indus Basin as well as for the implementation of 
96. See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. 6, Sept. 19, 1960, Ministry of
External Aff., http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus. 
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 6(1).
99. Id. art. 6(2).
100. See id. art. 6(1)(II)–(III). 
101. See id.
102. Id. art. 6(1) 
2017] The Indus Basin: Water Cooperation, International Law 59
engineering works for better water management.103 Paragraph 1 of 
Article VII of the IWT states: 
The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the 
optimum development of the Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their 
intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible 
extent . . . At the request of either Party, the two Parties may, by mutual 
agreement, co-operate in undertaking engineering works on the 
Rivers.104
Engineering works are required by both states for the effective 
management of their shared water resources because both need sufficient 
water for their agricultural sector.105 Both states are agrarian communities 
and therefore adequate water storage facilities for both are necessary.106
Furthermore, both nations have an electricity shortage, which is 
causing their people to face load-shedding.107 Both rely on the production 
of hydropower energy, because this is a relatively cheap and easy way of 
producing electricity.108 Hence, they also require new dams and water 
storage projects to be used for hydropower generation as well as to meet 
their agrarian demands.109 This indicates that the water-related needs of 
both states are of equal nature; however, owing to a lack of cooperation 
between the states, the fulfillment of water needs of one state has 
resulted in the exploitation of the other state. For instance, as mentioned 
earlier, India is constructing dams and large storage works for the 
production of hydropower to meet the demand for electricity of its ever-
increasing population.110 The construction of these dams is threatening 
103. See ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEMAKING 81–82 (Ken Conca & Geoffrey Dabelko 
eds., 2002); see also SHLOMI DINAR & ARIEL DINAR, INTERNATIONAL WATER SCARCITY 
AND VARIABILITY: MANAGING RESOURCE USE ACROSS POLITICAL BOUNDARIES 24 (2017). 
104. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, art. 7(1)(c). 
105. HANDBOOK ON FOOD: DEMAND, SUPPLY, SUSTAINABILITY AND SECURITY 449
(Raghbendra Jha et al. eds., 2014). 
106. Roic et al., supra note 51, at 63. 
107. MALDIVES: DOING BUSINESS IN MALDIVES FOR EVERYONE GUIDE – PRACTICAL 
INFORMATION AND CONTRACTS 124 (2012); see also DANIEL S. MARKEY, NO EXIT FROM
PAKISTAN: AMERICA’S TORTURED RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD 35 (2013). 
108. See Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 24, at 11. 
109. ANDREW A. KELLER ET AL., WATER SCARCITY AND THE ROLE OF STORAGE IN
DEVELOPMENT 3 (2000); MARKEY, supra note 107, at 230. 
110. See Akhtar, supra note 50, at 60. 
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the availability of adequate water in the Pakistani rivers.111 However, 
cooperation between the states as per the true spirit of the IWT will not 
only result in a mitigation of the national grievances that exist but will 
also create a symbiotic relationship between them in terms of satiating 
their needs related to river waters, as they can construct water works that 
benefit both of them instead of harming one state. 
Article VII of the IWT has provisions similar to the “duty to 
cooperate” recommended by the International Law of Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses.112 Article 8 of this law is specifically 
oriented toward the duty to cooperate, and it recommends that states 
cooperate in good faith and on the basis of equality and integrity to 
acquire the mutual benefits of sharing an international watercourse.113
They can also make joint mechanisms for facilitating cooperation and for 
taking collective measures for the construction of engineering works.114
The duty to cooperate is elaborated in detail in the next section. 
C. Resolution of Differences—the Permanent Indus Commission 
Furthermore, in the event of any differences, both states can resolve 
them through the Permanent Indus Commission, which comprises the 
officials nominated by both states and has the role of resolving 
differences by maintaining cooperation related to water management and 
utilization.115 If the Commission is unable to reach to a solution, then 
there is a proper mechanism for dispute resolution defined in Articles 
VIII and IX of the IWT, which can be referred to by both states to 
resolve conflicts related to water management.116 This indicates that a 
111. See id. at 65–66. 
112. See Magsig, supra note 64, at 85; RUTH VOLLMER ET. AL, UN-WATER
DECADE PROGRAMME ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 5 (2009). 
113. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, art. 8(1). 
114. Id. art. 8(2). 
115. MAHESH CHANDRA CHATURVEDI, INDIA’S WATERS: ENVIRONMENT,
ECONOMY, AND DEVELOPMENT 209 (2012). 
116. See Slavko Bogdanović, International Law of Water Resources: Contribution 
of the International Law Association (1954–2000), at 131 (Int’l and Nat’l Water Law and 
Policy Ser. No. 4, 2001); see also Water: A Shared Responsibility, The United Nations 
World Water Development Report 2 380 (2006); see Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, 
at arts. 8–9.
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proper operation of the IWT can not only maintain cooperation between 
India and Pakistan but also resolve disputes and differences between 
them. Furthermore, this can also result in effective water cooperation and 
water management practices in the region, which will result in benefits 
for both states. 
D. Adverse Climate Change—Article IV 
Furthermore, the IWT also provides guidance in the event of adverse 
climate effects, i.e., flooding, such that each country must inform the 
other beforehand if it has any information or confirmation of excessive 
flows of water in the river basins owing to abnormal rainfall or similar 
climate change.117 This is noted in Paragraph 8 of Article IV of the IWT, 
which states, “Each Party agrees to communicate to the other Party, as 
far in advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to 
such extraordinary discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows 
as may affect the other Party.”118
If such communication starts to take place between India and 
Pakistan, then both states may avoid the floods as, for instance, each can 
provide early information to the other so as to take emergency measures 
and protect the local community and livestock.119 For this purpose, swift, 
trustworthy, and effective cooperation between both states is required120.
117. Amitendu Palit and Gloria Spittel explain the Indus Waters Treaty as an 
example of a fine illustration of cooperation between India and Pakistan in the past, and 
then they explain the need to further establish cooperation over climate change between 
both states. See SOUTH ASIA IN THE NEW DECADE: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 129–31
(Amitendu Palit & Gloria Spittel eds., 2013). On the other hand, Natalie Nax argues in 
another way by maintaining an argument that although the Indus Waters Treaty has been 
helpful in providing support to India and Pakistan for situations of adverse climate 
change. See Natalie A. Nax, Looking to the Future: The Indus Waters Treaty and Climate 
Change (June 2016) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Oregon) (on file with the 
University of Oregon Graduate School). However, the nature of this support needs to be 
updated, improved and advanced further in order to tackle the problems of the 
contemporary changes in the climate that are of very adverse nature. See id.
118. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, art. 4(8). 
119. See generally THIRTY YEARS OF SAARC: SOCIETY, CULTURE AND
DEVELOPMENT 72–73 (Rajiv Kumar & Omita Goyal eds., 2016). 
120. See Nax, supra note 117, at 15. 
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The above provisions of the IWT describe the objective of the treaty 
to establish persistent and long-term water cooperation between India 
and Pakistan in utilizing the Indus Basin. Both states need to comply 
completely with the treaty. In particular, India should reconsider its 
contentious water storage projects to bring them into line with the IWT. 
IV. WATER COOPERATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW
Cooperation between riparian states is essential for the management 
of transboundary rivers.121 Therefore, international law ratifies 
cooperation as a duty for riparian states.122 The principle of the equitable 
utilization of transboundary river waters is a fine example of cooperation 
for water management123 because each riparian state shares an equitable 
portion of water resources with mutual consent and coordination.124 In 
this regard, the IWT is the best illustration of the implementation of the 
equitable utilization principle. 
121. See A. Heidari, Aras Transboundary River Basin Cooperative Perspective, in
DAMS AND RESERVOIRS UNDER CHANGING CHALLENGES 429, 429 (Anton J. Schleiss & 
Robert M. Boes eds., 2011); Virginia Hooper & Michael McWilliams, Case Studies of 
Transboundary Water Management Initiatives: Fifteen Initiative from Various Parts of 
the World, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 207, 
supra note 8, at 187, 207. 
122. Patricia Wouters & Christina Leb, The Duty to Cooperate in International 
Law – Examining the Contribution of the UN Water Conventions to Facilitating 
Transboundary Water Cooperation, in 4 THE UNECE CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION
AND USE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERCOURSES AND INTERNATIONAL LAKES : ITS 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL WATER COOPERATION 291, 293 (Int’l Water Law Ser.,
Stephen C. McCaffrey et al. eds., 2015). 
123. See generally LEB, supra note 10, at 86; see also Lilian del Castillo-Laborde, 
Sovereignty and Equitable Utilization: a Regional Implementation Summary, in 2
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 357, 361 (A History of Water Ser. 3, 
Terje Tvedt et al. eds., 2015). 
124. THE WORLD BANK, POLICY FOR PROJECTS ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS:
AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 97 (Law, Justice, and Development Ser. No. 
48741, Salman M. A. Salman ed., 2009). 
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A. The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
The International Law Commission (ILC)125 of the UN has also 
endorsed cooperation between riparian states for effective water 
management.126 The ILC presented the draft of the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1994, and this is 
considered the fundamental legal principles of international water law.127
The draft of this law includes several articles and provisions that were 
added by the UN General Assembly in the UN Convention on the Law of 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the UN 
Watercourses Convention) in 1997.128
1. Cooperation for Equitable Utilization
Several articles of the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses endorsed in the UN Watercourses Convention advocate 
cooperation between riparian states by explicitly mentioning it.129 For 
instance, the text of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Convention 
reads, “Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and 
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
125. See LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (2008); The International 
Commission (ILC) is an independent international legal body that was created by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947–48. Id.; The main role of the ILC is to 
stimulate the progressive development of the international law, particularly the charter of 
the United Nations, and its codifications at the international level. Id.; see also TREVOR
BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 67 (3rd ed. 2014); See also William A. Schabas, 
Accountability for International Crimes – Special Tribunals and Referrals to the 
International Criminal Court, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 173, 175 (Jared Genser & Bruno Stagno Ugarte eds., 2014). 
126. See generally Mary Crock, The Protection of Vulnerable Groups, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DISASTERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 383, 403 (Susan C. Breau 
& Katja L.H. Samuel eds., 2016). 
127. See generally Robert Mrljić, Challenges of Environmental Protection in 
Times of Armed Conflict, in ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 119, 134 (NATO Science for 
Peace and Security Ser. C: Environmental Security, Massimiliano Montini & Slavko 
Bogdanovic eds., 2011); see also LEB, supra note 10, at 62. 
128. See Mrljić, supra note 127, at 134. 
129. VOLLMER, supra note 112, at 5. 
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manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the 
watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development 
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.”130
Hence, it requires an equitable and reasonable utilization of shared 
transboundary river waters with the necessity of cooperation between the 
states sharing the water resource.131 Doing so will not only protect and 
guarantee their right to water but can also result in the development of 
the shared river basins.132 This further implies that India and Pakistan 
have an obligation to cooperate for the development and protection of the 
Indus Basin as well as for equitably distributing and utilizing its waters. 
Furthermore, in a commentary to the UN Watercourses Convention 
and in response to criticism by certain states against Articles 5 and 7 of 
the UN Watercourses Convention, the World Bank also endorsed 
cooperation between riparian states.133 Its official policy statement 
reads,134 “The Bank recognizes that the cooperation and goodwill of 
riparians is essential for the efficient use and protection of the waterway. 
Therefore, it attaches great importance to riparians making appropriate 
agreements or arrangements for these purposes for the entire waterway of 
any part thereof.”135
The World Bank also endorsed cooperative water management 
practices between riparian states and also offered to provide loans and 
technical assistance related to consultancy and sponsorship for the 
completion of the water management projects implemented after the 
fulfillment of the equitable water utilization principle for each riparian 
130. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, art. 4. 
131. IBRAHIM KAYA, EQUITABLE UTILIZATION: THE LAW OF THE NON-
NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 151 (2003); see also THE
WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 95.
132. LEB, supra note 10, at 85. 
133. See Surya P. Subedi, Resolution of International Water Disputes: Challenges 
for the 21st Century, in THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION/PEACE PALACE PAPERS:
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 33, 37—46 (The Int’l Bureau of 
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003) (critiquing the World Bank’s policy statement 
regarding cooperation between riparian states). 
134. ASHOK SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., REACHING ACROSS THE WATERS: FACING THE
RISKS OF COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS 91 (2012). 
135. Id.; see also FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR: BALANCING
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (Eric De Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini eds., 2014). 
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state.136 The main intention of this policy statement was to enhance 
cooperation between riparian states and to encourage them to manage 
shared water resources by developing their river basins cooperatively so 
as to maintain the principle of equitable utilization.137 This policy 
statement was issued by Ibrahim Shihata, who was then general counsel 
of the World Bank.138 He commented on the World Bank policy, “The 
fictitious dichotomy of the principles of equitable sharing of waters and 
of the need to avoid causing appreciable harm to any riparian state need 
not stand in the way of such cooperative management for the optimal and 
sustainable uses of international waterways.”139
Mr. Shihata issued this statement after Articles 5 and 7 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention were criticized by some states for noting the 
duty not to cause significant harm to the lower riparian states and the 
principle of equitable utilization as obligations for upper riparian 
states.140 In response to the criticisms, Mr. Shihata, in endorsing the 
policy statement of the World Bank, encouraged cooperation between 
riparian states whether or not they accepted Articles 5 and 7.141
2. The Duty to Cooperate
Alongside Articles 5 and 7, Article 8 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention defines cooperation, “Watercourses States shall cooperate on 
the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and 
good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection 
of an international watercourse.”142
As the title of Article 8 of the UN Watercourses Convention, “General 
obligation to cooperate,” indicates, this article makes it mandatory for 
states to cooperate, not only for the distribution and utilization of 
watercourses but also for making sure that the utilization is optimal and 
generates mutual benefits for both states on an equal basis.143
136. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 254. 
137. See SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 134, at 91. 
138. Subedi, supra note 133, at 45. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, art. 8. 
143. Id.
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Furthermore, cooperation is also necessary to ensure the preservation of 
the watercourses.144
This duty also applies to India and Pakistan. Pakistan has been 
fulfilling this obligation throughout the history of water cooperation 
brokered by the IWT; nonetheless, India has often shown inadequacies in 
maintaining this cooperation. For instance, it failed to hear and act upon 
the concerns of Pakistan regarding the Baglihar Dam, which led to the 
failure of dialogue between the states in 2004.145 Similarly, it also 
ignored Pakistan’s reservations to the Kishanganga and Ratle Dams.146
The bilateral talks also failed owing to India’s inflexible stance on 
continuing the construction of these dams without making any changes to 
their designs.147 Ultimately, the case of the Kishanganga Dam was 
brought to the Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which gave its verdict 
in the partial favor of both states.148 On the other hand, the decision for 
the Baglehar Dam was given by the neutral expert, Mr. Raymond Lafitte 
in favor of India.149 The failures of bilateral dialogue on these three 
Indian water storage projects in the last fifteen years has damaged water 
cooperation. 
This lack of cooperation is making the region geopolitically tense.150
Similarly, the persistence of conflict between India and Pakistan is 
hindering regional cooperation in South Asia.151 Both states now resort to 
144. Id. 
145. DINAR ET AL., supra note 57, at 332. 
146. Mubarak Zeb Khan, India Asked to Stop Work on Kishanganga and Ratle 
Projects, DAWN, https://www.dawn.com/news/1309767 (last updated Jan. 21, 2017). 
147. INDIA AND THE AGE OF CRISIS: THE LOCAL POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC
AND ECOLOGICAL FRAGILITY 95 (Michael Gillan & Rob Lambert eds., 2016). 
148. See Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of Noncooperation, supra
note 20, at 40. The verdict by the court favored India’s stance to continue to the 
construction of the Kishanganga Dam, but it also gave the decision in favor of Pakistan to 
slightly change the design of the dam. Id.
149. Id.; see also DINAR & DINAR, supra note 103, at 332 (discussing the details of 
the final decision given by the neutral expert Mr. Raymond Lafitte, appointed by the 
World Bank). 
150. SOUTH ASIA’S WEAK STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE REGIONAL INSECURITY
PREDICAMENT 108 (T.V. Paul ed., 2010).  
151. See MARIO TELÒ, REGIONALISM IN HARD TIMES (2016). For instance, the 
regional cooperative organization, SAARC, becomes ineffective in establishing regional 
economic cooperation owing to the bilateral conflicts and sense of hostilities between two 
of its major players, India and Pakistan. Id.
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the third party more often than deciding a certain difference bilaterally 
through mutual cooperation.152 For instance, the recent threats of India to 
revoke or modify the IWT has also resulted in both states seeking either 
the assistance of the Court of Arbitration (by Pakistan) or the neutral 
expert (by India), as both have sidestepped the bilateral cooperation 
processes between them.153 Pakistan’s resort to the Court of Arbitration is 
because India has not listened to Pakistan’s concerns over its 
controversial water storage projects in the last two decades.154 India is 
constructing several dams in its territory over the Pakistani western rivers 
and Pakistan has serious reservations to such dams, which India has 
repeatedly ignored.155 On the other hand, India’s resort to the neutral 
expert is probably because it is not keen on maintaining bilateral water 
cooperation with Pakistan. As a result, it is not interested in any bilateral 
talks that may include a discussion of Pakistan’s concerns or that may 
compel it to establish water cooperation over the Indus Basin’s
resources. Such Indian motives are against the true spirit of the general 
obligation to cooperate, which is applicable to both states.156
3. Cooperation for Joint Management of Watercourses
The second paragraph of Article 8 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention also explains the methods through which this cooperation 
can be achieved. This article reads, “in determining the manner of such 
cooperation, watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint 
mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them.”157
Furthermore, with the ever-growing demands of the rapidly increasing 
population of states, it is likely that conflicts may arise between the states 
during the utilization of water resources or during the construction of 
152. See e.g., SUMIT GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS
SINCE 1947 41 (2001); see also Gayarthri Lakshminarayan, U.S. Mediation in the 
Kashmir Conflict: Mediation vs. Conflict Management, in PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIAN
SECURITY 189 (Shanthie Mariet D’Souza & Rajshree Jetly eds., 2013) (regarding India’s 
eagerness to approach third party for disputes with Pakistan).
153. See Iqbal, supra note 5. 
154. See id. 
155. See Akhtar, supra note 50.  
156. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, art. 8. 
157. Id.
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integrated water management works.158 Therefore, cooperation between 
the states is the only way through which differences and conflicts can be 
resolved bilaterally, as is evident from state practice.159
In addition, Articles 20 to 25 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
relate to the “preservation, protection, and management of the 
international transboundary watercourses.”160 These articles also endorse 
cooperation between riparian states and ratify the cooperation as 
essential for the proper management of shared watercourses.161
In the case of the riparian states in South Asia, India and Pakistan, the 
IWT establishes a joint body for cooperation.162 The Permanent Indus 
Commission works to maintain sustainable bilateral cooperation over the 
utilization of the Indus Basin.163 The Commission comprises officials 
from both states, and it is also responsible for resolving any differences 
or issues related to the interpretations and implementations of the IWT.164
However, with the recent airing of official statements from the Indian 
government regarding revocation of the IWT,165 a sense of hostility has 
emerged between the states, which has nullified the effectiveness of the 
Permanent Indus Commission for resolving differences over the 
utilization of Indus water.166 In the event that the IWT is revoked, the
Permanent Indus Commission will automatically terminate,167 which will 
create a vacuum for water cooperation between both states.
158. Hilmi S. Salem, Social, Environmental and Security Impacts of Climate 
Change on the Eastern Mediterranean, in COPING WITH GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE, DISASTERS AND SECURITY: THREATS, CHALLENGES, VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS
421, 422 (Hans Günter Brauch et al. eds., 2011). 
159. Aaron T. Wolf, Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict 
Resolution, 12 INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. 20 (1996).   
160. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, at arts. 20–25. 
161. Id. 
162. See DINAR ET AL., supra note 57, at 207. 
163. ZENTNER, supra note 29, at 137–38.   
164. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 70. 
165. Khaleeq Kiani, Interview: ‘Indus Treaty Can’t Be Revoked Unilaterally’,
DAWN, https://www.dawn.com/news/1286307 (last updated Sept. 27, 2016). 
166. See India, Pakistan Need to Respect Indus Waters Treaty, Urges Khawaja 
Asif, DAWN, https://www.dawn.com/news/1321705 (last updated Mar. 20, 2017). 
167. See GUPTA, supra note 4, at 260 (explaining details about the legal basis for 
working and existence of the Permanent Indus Commission). This is because the 
Permanent Indus Commission was created as per the Article VIII of the Indus Waters 
Treaty and therefore, it is the Indus Waters Treaty that provides the basis for formulation 
2017] The Indus Basin: Water Cooperation, International Law 69
B. The Berlin Rules 
In addition to the UN Watercourses Convention, the Helsinki and 
Berlin Rules also endorse cooperation and management of international 
water resources.168 The Berlin Rules replaced the Helsinki Rules in 
2004.169
1. Cooperation for Mutual Benefit
To endorse water cooperation, Article 11 of the Berlin Rules 
exclusively directs riparian states that share one or more common river 
basins to cooperate for mutual benefit.170 Article 11 reads, “Basin States 
shall cooperate in good faith in the management of waters of an 
international drainage basin for the mutual benefit of the participating 
States.”171
However, in the Indus Basin, the mutual benefits for India and 
Pakistan may not be a possible outcome of resorting to third-party 
arbitration of issues. The mutual benefits can only be acquired through 
strong, trustworthy, and persistent bilateral cooperation over the 
distribution of the Indus Basin as well as for the development and 
and functioning of the Permanent Indus Commission as a joint body for cooperation 
between both states over the Indus basin’s water. Id. Without the Indus Waters Treaty, 
the implementation of the Article VIII would itself remain null and void and therefore, 
the fundamental legal basis for existence of Permanent Indus Commission will no longer 
be present. Id. See also DINAR ET. AL, supra note 57, at 207. 
168. Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Principles of Transboundary Water 
Resources Management and the Frontier Watercourses Agreement Between Finland and 
Russia, in 2 SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 449, supra note 123, at 447, 
449; see also SUBRAMANIAN ET. AL, supra note 134, at 100. 
169. LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
203 (2013); See also Onita Das, Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict: Filling in 
the Gaps with Sustainable Development, in WAR AND THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW
APPROACHES TO PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICT 149, 
151 (Rosemary Rayfuse ed., 2014). 
170. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law, art. 11, 
(2004), https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-
2004.pdf. 
171. Id. 
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upgrading of the basin.172 In such bilateral cooperation over 
watercourses, each state shares its intentions regarding utilization and 
management of the Basin. Furthermore, each state also discusses its own 
concerns as well as the concerns of the other parties related to any water 
management project. Therefore, India and Pakistan can not only share 
their plans for managing the watercourses but can also improve them 
through improved bilateral discussions that would involve suggestions 
and recommendations from both sides to improve mutual water 
management activities. This would also result in sustainable 
development and integrated management of the Indus Basin, which is 
necessary for the preservation and development of the Basin’s natural 
environment.173 The preservation of the Basin is in the interest of both 
states because both want to utilize the Indus Basin for a longer period of 
time owing to their dependence on it. 
2. Cooperation for Drought and Flood Control
Articles 34 and 35 of the Berlin Rules give guidelines for riparian 
states in the event of any floods and droughts, respectively.174 Articles 34 
and 35 also endorse maintaining effective cooperation and exchange of 
172. INST. FOR REG’L STUDIES OF THE CALIFORNIAS, BORDERS AND BORDER
REGIONS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 130 (Paul Ganster et. al eds., 1997); see also
DENNIS E. MITHAUG, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY THEORY 20 (1996).
173. See PROMOTING EQUITY, COOPERATION AND INNOVATION IN THE FIELDS OF 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: THE LEGACY OF DR.
DAVID J.H. PHILLIPS 381 (Steven McCaffrey et. al eds., 2017) (The book discusses the 
beneficial aspects of implementing an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
approach which ratifies a river basin as a single unit. Therefore, inferring from this 
argument, the Indus River Basin ought to be considered as a single water resource unit if 
the IWRM approach is implemented in the basin. The book also provide\ certain 
examples of transboundary river water apportionment among riparian states in which the 
failure resulted in effectively managing the shared water resources due to the absence of 
the cooperation among riparian states and due to a lack of implementation of an 
Integrated Water Resource Management approach. Thus, establishment of the IWRM 
approach and cooperation among the upper and lower riparian states, India and Pakistan, 
respectively, is essentially required in the region if both states want to utilize the Indus 
River water resource in an optimal and mutually beneficial manner). 
174. See Int’l Law Ass’n, supra note 170, art. 34–35. 
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data between riparian states to avert floods and droughts, as stated 
below:175
Article 34: States shall cooperate in developing and implementing 
measures for flood control, having due regard to the interests of other 
States likely to be affected by the flooding.176
Article 35: States shall cooperate in the management of waters to 
prevent, control, or mitigate droughts, having due regard to the interests 
of other basin States.177
Sharing of accurate and up-to-date data with the other riparian states 
related to water quality, quantity, and threats of floods, droughts, 
significant changes in expected rainfalls, consequent flows of water in 
the river basins, etc., is mandatory for riparian states.178 For this purpose, 
riparian states must acquire accurate data on a regular basis. An accurate 
and immediate exchange of information will help both states in their 
water management endeavors.179 Article 56 of the Berlin Rules relates to 
the exchange of information among riparian states for utilizing their 
shared river basins.180 The language of Article 56 recommends that 
riparian states cooperate with one another to provide accurate and up-to-
date information regarding the basin in their territories as well as 
regarding their planned water management works.181 Furthermore, 
Article 56 also makes it obligatory to gather data related to the basin on a 
regular basis.182
However, for the Indus Basin, India has shown hesitation in providing 
up-to-date and accurate information to Pakistan regarding its water 
storage projects.183 Most of the time, India delays sharing any data for 
175. Id. 
176. Id. art. 34. 
177. See id. art. 35. 
178. Id. 
179. See ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION IN EUROPEAN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT 32 (Jos G. Timmerman & Sindre Langaas eds., 2003); see also
HANDBOOK OF ENGINEERING HYDROLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL HYDROLOGY AND WATER
MANAGEMENT 308 (Saeid Eslamian ed., 2014). 
180. See Int’l Law Ass’n, supra note 170, art. 56. 
181. Id. 
182. Id.
183. See HOSSAIN & JONES, supra note 34, at 36. 
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several months, and sometimes several years, related to either its water 
management works or its future plans of utilization of the basin.184 This 
raises suspicions against India’s planned water storage projects, which 
Pakistan has raised concerns over.185
Nonetheless, if India starts sharing information related to its water 
projects on regular basis, then this would end the ongoing sense of 
hostility, doubts, and suspicions that are damaging water cooperation 
between the states. Therefore, the bilateral, regular exchange of 
information holds significant importance in maintaining trustworthy and 
sustainable water cooperation. 
C. The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes 
The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, drafted by the United Nations 
Economic Commission on Europe (UNECE), gives guidelines for 
establishing cooperation between riparian states and formulating 
mechanisms for information sharing and transboundary water resource 
monitoring.186 This convention was also called the Helsinki Convention 
because it was drafted in Helsinki.187
1. Joint Basin Monitoring Mechanisms
Notably, according to this convention, the formulation of joint 
independent bodies can enhance cooperation between riparian states for 
their transboundary river waters.188 Article 9 of this convention 
recommends the formation of independent joint bodies, which should be 
unbiased in their arrangements, reflecting their bilateral nature.189 It also 
184. Abdul Rauf Iqbal, Hydro-Politics in India and its Impact on Pakistan, 2014 
ISSRA PAPERS 101, 106–07 (2014).
185. See id.
186. KERSTIN MECHLEM & STEFANO BURCHI, GROUNDWATER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: COMPILATION OF TREATIES AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 521 (2005). 
187. WATER RESOURCES SYSTEM OPERATION 517 (Vijay P. Singh & Ram Narayan 
Yadava eds., 2003). 
188. See MECHLEM & BURCHI, supra note 186, at 522.
189. See WATER RESOURCES SYSTEM OPERATION, supra note 187, at 517. 
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formulates mechanisms for the functioning of such joint bodies.190 It 
asserts that the work of the joint bodies will involve several measures, 
such as the collection and exchange of data related to pollution and other 
transboundary impacts, the administration of joint monitoring programs 
related to assessing the quality and quantity of water and elaboration of 
limits of flows of water, and to evaluate the wastage of water.191
Furthermore, their responsibilities will also include the communication 
of emergency warnings related to the quality and quantity of water to 
both states.192
Article 9 of the Helsinki Convention further requires that the joint 
bodies should also have the role of promoting the implementation of 
environmental measures under the obligation of international regulations 
and enhancing cooperation between states sharing water resources at all 
possible levels related to the watercourses.193 Furthermore, Article 10 of 
the convention supports mutual consultation between riparian states over 
all aspects related to the management of their shared water resources.194
Article 11 of the convention endorses joint monitoring and assessments 
of the shared watercourses and quality of water in the river basins.195
Article 12 of the convention supports the establishment of joint research 
and development mechanisms between riparian states for the better 
management of their shared water resources.196
However, in the Indus Basin, there are no joint monitoring 
mechanisms working at present. With the current wave of hostility 
between the states, deterioration in the functioning of the Permanent 
Indus Commission has taken place, which has further diminished the 
possibility of any joint monitoring and assessment mechanisms over the 
Indus Basin. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to mention here that an 
190. Id. 
191. Id.
192. See Convention on the Protection and Use of Boundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes art. 9, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 270 (describing nature of 
agreements between Riparian Parties).
193. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Role of Diplomatic Means of Solving 
Water Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional Mechanisms, in THE PERMANENT
COURT OF ARBITRATION/PEACE PALACE PAPERS: RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
DISPUTES, supra note 133, at 91, 105.
194. WATER RESOURCES SYSTEM OPERATION, supra note 187, at 517. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
74 Michigan State ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ [Vol. 26.1
implementation of such mechanisms can facilitate stronger water 
cooperation between the states because such mechanisms will share 
accurate and complete information related to the water management 
endeavors of both states, which will end bilateral suspicion and distrust. 
The above discussion illustrates that international law has a strong 
support for maintaining cooperation among riparian states.197 It even 
applies a general obligation on states to establish cooperation for the 
distribution, utilization, preservation, sustainable management, 
development, and upgrading of their shared transboundary watercourses 
and river basins.198 This further implies a stronger application of the 
obligation to cooperate to both the upper and lower riparian states of 
India and Pakistan, respectively. Bilateral cooperation over the shared 
Indus Basin can lead to mutual benefits that will be enough for both 
states to meet the rapidly escalating water-related needs of their ever-
growing populations. 
V. EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE COOPERATION
The IWT is the finest example of cooperation between states over the 
utilization and management of their transboundary shared river basins, as 
mentioned earlier.199 However, there are other examples. 
A. Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and 
Protection of Interstate Water Resources 
In 1992, five Central Asian republics – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – signed the Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate 
Water Resources.200 This agreement endorses cooperation among the 
states for the joint management of their shared transboundary 
197. Wouters & Leb, supra note 122, at 293. 
198. del Castillo-Laborde, supra note 123, at 361. 
199. See THE IMPACT OF ASIAN POWERS ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 
95, at 84. 
200. Patricia Wouters, Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving 
International Water Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional Mechanisms, in THE 
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION/PEACE PALACE PAPERS: RESOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES, supra note 133, at 111, 133. 
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watercourses.201 The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination was 
founded with the core purpose of establishing cooperation among these 
republics.202
B. Agreement on Cooperation for Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River 
Another example is the distribution and management of the Mekong 
River basin. This transboundary river originates in Tibet and flows 
through China, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam 
before reaching the sea.203 In 1995, an agreement was signed by the 
countries sharing the Mekong River:204 the Agreement on Cooperation 
for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River.205 As is apparent 
from its title, this agreement has the core goal of establishing cooperation 
among the states sharing the river for the better utilization and 
management of the Mekong River water as well as for the development 
and upgrading of the Mekong River basin.206 The Mekong River 
Committee, established in 1957, comprises the ministerial-level officials 
of the states sharing the Mekong River.207 It is the supreme body for 
deciding any issues that arise among the states.208 This committee 
ensures a proper mechanism for cooperation among the states and for the 
management of the Mekong River water.209 Information sharing has also 
been approved by China, which shares information related to the quantity 
201. Id. 
202. See id. at 133–34. 
203. SHAFIQUL ISLAM & LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, WATER DIPLOMACY: A
NEGOTIATED APPROACH TO MANAGING COMPLEX WATER NETWORKS 320 (2013); see also
POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY WATERSHED: THE CASE OF THE
LOWER MEKONG BASIN 10 (Joakim Öjendal et al. eds., 2011); see also NGO THE VINH,
MEKONG THE OCCLUDING RIVER: THE TALE OF A RIVER 234 (2010). 
204. ASHOK SWAIN, MANAGING WATER CONFLICT: ASIA, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST 160 (2004).
205. VICTOR D. CHA ET AL., ASIA’S RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL 
DISASTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR AN EVOLVING REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE 56 (Robert S. 
Wang & Jeffrey D. Bean eds., 2010). 
206. VASUDHA PANGARE ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTEGRATED WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 68 (2006). 
207. See Wouters, supra note 200, at 135. 
208. Id. at 135–36.
209. Id. 
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of water and any changes in the flow of water in the Mekong River with 
the other riparian countries.210 The information sharing agreement was 
signed by China with the Mekong River Committee in April 2002, which 
suggests that, over time, cooperation for water management has been 
enhanced among the Mekong River sharing states.211
C. International Boundary Waters Treaty 
Similar practices of cooperation are also practiced in Europe, where 
the Helsinki and Berlin Rules are followed, as well as in North America, 
where local laws and principles are implemented between Canada and 
the U.S. as well as between Mexico and the U.S. For instance, the 1909 
Boundary Waters Treaty provides guidance on transboundary water 
sharing between Canada and the U.S.212 It also mandates cooperation 
between the states and provides a dispute resolution mechanism, which 
automatically instigates cooperation between Canada and the U.S. over 
the utilization and management of their shared transboundary 
watercourses.213
On a similar note, the 1944 International Boundary Waters Treaty is a 
bilateral treaty that provides rules for the utilization and management of 
shared transboundary watercourses between the U.S. and Mexico.214 An 
International Boundary Waters Commission was also established under 
the rules of this treaty, which requires cooperation from the U.S. and 
Mexico over the management and distribution of their shared 
watercourses.215
This indicates that cooperation for water management has been 
generally accepted by states and is adopted for the development and 
management of their shared river basins. It further suggests that 
cooperation for shared water management is, in fact, fundamental state 
practice for the utilization, distribution, and management of 
transboundary water resources. In consequence, India and Pakistan 
should also maintain effective bilateral cooperation for better utilization 
210. Id. at 137. 
211. See id.
212. See id. at 146. 
213. Id. at 147. 
214. Id. at 149. 
215. Id. at 149–51.
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and management of the Indus Basin. This will eventually enable them to 
realize collective goals related to meeting demands for, e.g., generation 
of electricity, as well as the utilization of river waters for irrigation for 
their ever-increasing population. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Water cooperation is a term involving collaboration among states for 
the distribution of shared transboundary watercourses and for the optimal 
utilization of these watercourses.216 The establishment of effective 
cooperation among riparian states can help them in communicating their 
concerns related to planned water utilization projects.217 In turn, lower 
riparian states can no longer be adversely affected by the water storage 
projects of upper riparian states. In this regard, water cooperation among 
riparian states also necessitates the emergence of joint bodies that 
comprise officials of both lower and upper riparian states.218 The joint 
body will also be responsible for the exchange of data related to the 
water storage capacities and utilizations of water by each state as well as 
for the sharing of any information related to the probable threat of floods 
in the shared river basins.219 Such an exchange of information through 
mutual cooperation can protect states from the adverse effects of floods, 
as the states can make arrangements to mitigate the risks and dangers of 
floods. 
In this regard, the IWT is an example of an international agreement 
that establishes cooperation between two hostile states, India and 
Pakistan, for the distribution and utilization of the Indus River and its 
five tributaries. The signing of the treaty was facilitated by the World 
Bank in 1960.220 It allocated the three eastern river tributaries of the 
Indus Basin to India and the three western river tributaries to Pakistan.221
216. LEB, supra note 10, at 1–2.
217. PETER LYON, CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
79, 84 (2008). 
218. See Hollaender, supra note 1, at 325–26. 
219. Id.; see also Convention on the Protection and Use of Boundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, supra note 192, art. 9.
220. GARMESTANI & ALLEN, supra note 26, 185.  
221. LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 163–64 (1967). 
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Both states were allowed unrestricted use of their own river tributaries 
but were allowed only nonconsumptive use of each other’s tributaries.222
Disputes have been raised over several Indian water storage projects 
as these projects make consumptive use of the Pakistani western rivers.223
Consumptive use of another state’s rivers is a violation of the IWT.224 It 
is necessary that both states should facilitate bilateral talks and dialogues, 
cooperating with each other to discuss contentious water storage projects 
on the Indus Basin. Solid and persistent cooperation between them can 
enable them to resolve their bilateral water disputes and can also improve 
the hostile nature of the relations between them. The IWT provides a 
mechanism for sustaining such cooperation by offering provisions of 
water cooperation.225 For instance, Article VI of the IWT requires that 
both states regularly share data related to their water storage projects.226
Similarly, Article VIII provides the basis for the establishment of 
Permanent Indus Commission, which not only is responsible for 
resolving their differences related to water storage works but also 
facilitates the exchange of information.227 Cooperation in the Law of 
Transboundary Water Resources 
Similarly, Article IV of the IWT makes it mandatory for each state to 
inform the other of the possibilities of adverse climate change that may 
result in abnormal increases or decreases in the flow of river waters in 
the near future, causing inundation or drought in the regions surrounding 
the shared Indus Basin.228 Such communication cannot take place without 
immediate and effective bilateral cooperation between the states. 
Therefore, water cooperation between India and Pakistan is essential for 
proper implementation of the IWT and for the better utilization of their 
shared Indus Basin.229 A trustworthy cooperation between India and 
Pakistan will enable both the countries to give heed to their bilateral 
222. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, art. 2. 
223. See Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of Noncooperation, supra 
note 20, at 40. 
224. S. K. AGARWAL & P. S. DUBEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES 86 (2002). 
225. SINGH, supra note 3, at 151. 
226. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, art. 6. 
227. Id. art. 8; see also WATER CRISIS IN INDIA, supra note 4, at 260. 
228. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 97, art. 4. 
229. SCOTT BARRETT, THE WORLD BANK, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 8, 12 (1994). 
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concerns, especially those concerns that are related to the Indus basin.230
Both states can establish joint engineering works to manage the waters 
properly for better utilization in agriculture and hydropower 
generation.231
In addition to the IWT, other provisions of international law also carry 
certain obligations for maintaining effective cooperation between 
riparian states.232 Article 8 of the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses includes a duty to cooperate for the 
distribution, utilization, and management of their transboundary 
watercourses.233 Similarly, the Berlin Rules also recommend cooperation 
between upper and lower riparian states.234 In addition, the UNECE 
Convention has also provided several recommendations related to the 
establishment of joint cooperation mechanisms and groups for 
maintaining sustainable cooperation between riparian states for the 
environmental protection of the watercourses as well as for information 
sharing and optimal utilization of the watercourses.235
Being members of the international community and the United 
Nations, an exceptional duty is borne by both India and Pakistan to 
establish the cooperation with each other necessary for the utilization of 
their shared Indus Basin and to avoid causing any harm to each other. 
However, certain Indian water storage works are harming the availability 
of water and, consequently, the agrarian infrastructure of Pakistan. This 
is because Pakistan’s agricultural sector is heavily dependent on an 
adequate flow of water in the Indus Basin,236 but the water in the Indus 
Basin reaches Pakistan after passing through Indian territory.237
230. See PETER LYON, supra note 217, at 79. 
231. See generally id.
232. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 8, at 69–70. 
233. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 19, art. 8. 
234. SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 134, at 100. 
235. Convention on the Protection and Use of Boundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, supra note 192, art. 9. 
236. Muhamad Azim Khan et al., Impact of Climate Change on Flora of High 
Altitudes in Pakistan, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ECOSYSTEMS
361, 366 (Münir Öztürk et al. eds., 2015); see also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING
WORLD 874 (Thomas M. Leonard ed., 2013). 
237. Tiwari & Joshi, supra note 23, at 73. 
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Bilateral water cooperation is in the interests of both states because 
their water-related needs are of an equivalent nature238 which can be met 
mutually in a better way.239 Both can share the recommendations related 
to the optimal utilization of the Indus Basin’s water with each other and 
can work together to devise joint strategies relating to the optimal 
utilization of their water resources. For this purpose, the integrated water 
management schemes will prove beneficial for meeting the water-related 
needs of both states.240
In addition to the IWT, the International Boundary Waters Treaty is 
another treaty that endorses cooperation among states.241 It is in effect in 
North America for water cooperation between the U.S. and Canada as 
well as between Mexico and the U.S.242 Water cooperation has been 
established among several other riparian states. For instance, the 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and 
Protection of Interstate Water Resources established long-term 
cooperation among the Central Asian republics.243 Similarly, excellent 
water cooperation has been established among the states that share the 
Mekong River basin, China, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia.244 These states are utilizing the water of the Mekong River to 
meet their needs.245 Moreover, the persistence of water cooperation 
among them has prevented water-related disputes among them. On a 
similar note, water cooperation is in effect in Europe among different 
European Union states in accordance with the Helsinki Rules, superseded 
by the Berlin Rules and the UN Watercourses Convention.246
238. AMIT GUPTA, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH: INDIA 48 (2012). 
239. NURIT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11
(1994) (detailing the principle of mutual benefits). 
240. Francesca Giannoni et al., The Value of the Italian Civil Protection System in 
Integrated Water Management for the Mediterranean Environment, in INTEGRATED
WATER MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND CASE STUDIES 33, 33 (P. Meire et 
al. eds., 2007). 
241. See Wouters, supra note 200, at 149. 
242. Id. at 146. 
243. Id. at 133. 
244. ISLAM & SUSSKIND, supra note 203, at 129. 
245. POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY WATERSHED, supra note 
203, at 10.
246. See Wouters, supra note 200, at 146. 
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The instances of water cooperation listed above are generating mutual 
benefits.247 These states are meeting their needs related to the common 
watercourses without harming the other parties. Therefore, on a parallel 
note, there is also a need to maintain cooperation between India and 
Pakistan, in accordance with the spirit of the IWT and the legal 
principles and obligations of international law. Pakistan has showed a 
keen interest in establishing and maintaining such cooperation for the 
long term, as is evident from the history of dialogues between the states. 
Therefore, India also needs to provide an equal response by taking 
concrete steps to maintain cooperation. 
247. Id. at 153. 
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